Dynamic beliefs

Macera R.

Keywords: incentives, Optimal beliefs, Anticipatory utility, Reference-dependent utility, Bonuses

Abstract

This paper studies the temporal path of subjective probability assessments. A reference-dependent agent who experiences utility from anticipation and from changes in this anticipatory emotion makes utility-maximizing assessments about his likelihood of success in a future lottery. Consistent with the empirical evidence, the model predicts that if the lottery is sufficiently valuable, optimism decreases as the payoff date approaches. Intuitively, as time goes by, last-period expected disappointment becomes increasingly important relative to the joy of anticipating a favorable outcome. Applying the model to the optimal timing of productivity bonuses, I find that a decreasing path of beliefs reduces the cost of providing incentives. Thus, optimal bonuses are sizable and are not frequently offered. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Más información

Título según WOS: Dynamic beliefs
Título según SCOPUS: Dynamic beliefs
Título de la Revista: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
Volumen: 87
Editorial: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Fecha de publicación: 2014
Página de inicio: 1
Página final: 18
Idioma: English
DOI:

10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.003

Notas: ISI, SCOPUS