Abstract

This paper presents an interpretation of the act of congress N 19.966 GES (ex AUGE) that justifies its specialty in relation to the Constitutional Organic Law of General Bases of the State Administration (LOCBGAE). On this starting point, it is argued that the liability system for lack of service of the aforementioned law is (partially) special in relation to the LOCBGAE. This specialty relationship implies that the judge has a very precise burden of argumentation: he must integrate the principles of access, opportunity, cost and equity of the health system to the imputation of responsibility judgment, since this is the only way to interpret and integrate the clause "Lack of service" in a manner consistent with health legislation. Thus, it is argued that the consideration of these principles is more intense in the case of lack of service for GES benefits than in the case of general health benefits. Finally, to make the integration in the judicial reasoning it is proposed to use the model of specification of principles that, in another context, the Theory of Law has developed to solve the problem of judicial reasoning in cases where there are principles in conflict.