Institutions influence preferences: Evidence from a common pool resource experiment

Rodriguez-Sickert, C.; Guzman, RA; Cárdenas JC

Abstract

We model the dynamic effects of external enforcement on the exploitation of a common pool resource. Fitting our model to experimental data we find that institutions influence social preferences. We solve two puzzles in the data: the increase and later erosion of cooperation when commoners vote against the imposition of a fine, and the high deterrence power of low fines. When fines are rejected, internalization of a social norm explains the increased cooperation; violations (accidental or not), coupled with reciprocal preferences, account for the erosion. Low fines stabilize cooperation by preventing a spiral of negative reciprocation. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Más información

Título según WOS: Institutions influence preferences: Evidence from a common pool resource experiment
Título según SCOPUS: Institutions influence preferences: Evidence from a common pool resource experiment
Título de la Revista: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATION
Volumen: 67
Número: 1
Editorial: Sciencedirect
Fecha de publicación: 2008
Página de inicio: 215
Página final: 227
Idioma: English
URL: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0167268107001412
DOI:

10.1016/j.jebo.2007.06.004

Notas: ISI, SCOPUS