Abstract

In this paper we defend the idea that ecological psychology is in a good position for making sense of bodily experience by naturalizing some of the most important features of Husserlian lived experience, such as kinesthetics or proprioception. Some postcognitivist researchers have suggested that the notion of lived experience, originated in Husserl’s phenomenological project, is fundamental to make sense of the concept of bodily experience. Recently, it has been suggested that, when considering Husserl’s notion of lived experience, ecological psychology lacks the conceptual resources to make sense of this notion, for it is focused on goal-directed tasks. In contrast, enactivism is allegedly in better shape to make sense of the concept due to its direct roots in the phenomenological tradition. After contextualizing the debate, in this paper we claim that all the relevant aspects attributed to the Husserlian notion of lived experience can be accounted for within the scientific framework of ecological psychology. We conclude that there are enough materials to start defining an embodied and situated naturalization of the notion of bodily experience from an ecological perspective. © The Author(s) 2025