Abstract

The Agency Theory indicates that one of the causes of the Agency problem between Agent and Principal is the asymmetry of information, which generates efficiency costs for organizations, in this case, universities. This paper postulates that the perception of the existence of asymmetry is not independent of the organizational context and the characteristics of the individuals. The general objective is to determine the factors that influence the perception of information asymmetries in the corporate governments of Ibero-American universities. To achieve the objective, two matching procedures are performed, also using a bootstrapping process to obtain more accurate results. Personal characteristics of experts and organizational variables from Ibero-American universities are analyzed. Although the results indicate that there are statistically significant differences in variables associated with the individual characteristics of the experts, there are more organizational variables that affect the perception of information asymmetry. Thus, a low hierarchical position of individuals within the university and the existence of a dual leadership structure of corporate governments of universities are determinants of a higher perception of information asymmetry.