Asymmetric Information With Multiple Risks: The Case of the Chilean Private Health Insurance Market
Abstract
We extend the Rothshild and Stiglitz (1976) model to two sources of risk -inpatient and outpatient risk- to better proxy real-world health insurance markets. We uncover an interesting theoretical possibility: Take individuals A and B, who are low risks in, say, the inpatient dimension but A is riskier in the outpatient dimension. Then, A may enjoy less coverage than B in the inpatient dimension (coverage reversal). This phenomenon indicates that when testing for adverse selection in a given dimension, one has to treat individuals who differ in the other dimension separately. With this insight in mind, we adapt the Chiappori and Salani & eacute; (2000) positive correlation test to this multi-dimensionality and use it to test for adverse selection using individual-level claims data for the privately insured in Chile. This empirical analysis indicates that overlooking the aforementioned need of separating samples can potentially lead to biased conclusions.
Más información
| Título según WOS: | ID WOS:001655094100001 Not found in local WOS DB |
| Título de la Revista: | HEALTH ECONOMICS |
| Volumen: | 35 |
| Número: | 5 |
| Editorial: | Wiley |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2026 |
| Página de inicio: | 712 |
| Página final: | 729 |
| DOI: |
10.1002/hec.70075 |
| Notas: | ISI |