Abstract

This article studies the effect of sectoral crises on policy reform by emphasizing the conflictive incentives generated by public demands for a solution. On the one hand, the crisis provides the opportunity for bypassing veto points for technical innovation. On the other hand, if simultaneous with increasing electoral competition, it reduces the time horizons of policymakers and their propensity to adopt reforms of uncertain effects for them. Our research traces these on the Chilean 1998-99 electricity crisis, and assesses their impact on policy change through a comparative analysis of reform contents. This article shows how electoral effects prevailed in the context of upcoming competitive elections, suggesting the importance of introducing electoral competition in the study of crises effects on policymaking in the region. Our research strategy for tracing incentives and opportunities generated by crises can travel to other cases to further our understanding of crises' effects on policymaking. (c) 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.