Dynamic beliefs
Keywords: incentives, Optimal beliefs, Anticipatory utility, Reference-dependent utility, Bonuses
Abstract
This paper studies the temporal path of subjective probability assessments. A reference-dependent agent who experiences utility from anticipation and from changes in this anticipatory emotion makes utility-maximizing assessments about his likelihood of success in a future lottery. Consistent with the empirical evidence, the model predicts that if the lottery is sufficiently valuable, optimism decreases as the payoff date approaches. Intuitively, as time goes by, last-period expected disappointment becomes increasingly important relative to the joy of anticipating a favorable outcome. Applying the model to the optimal timing of productivity bonuses, I find that a decreasing path of beliefs reduces the cost of providing incentives. Thus, optimal bonuses are sizable and are not frequently offered. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Más información
| Título según WOS: | Dynamic beliefs |
| Título según SCOPUS: | Dynamic beliefs |
| Título de la Revista: | GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR |
| Volumen: | 87 |
| Editorial: | ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2014 |
| Página de inicio: | 1 |
| Página final: | 18 |
| Idioma: | English |
| DOI: |
10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.003 |
| Notas: | ISI, SCOPUS |