Abstract

The section ‘Morality’ of the Phenomenology of Spirit contains one of the most severe Hegelian attacks to the Kantian theory of morality. It is not quite clear, however, that the critiques expounded by Hegel actually reach the core of the Kantian theory, for they are aimed to the theory of the ‘postulates of practical reason’ which today do not seem central for an evaluation of a moral theory of a Kantian type (although perhaps they are central to assess the historical Kant). And if such postulates are examined in the Kantian texts themselves, even though they may appear as an unattractive attempt to complete the theory of morality, we may find that they are well justified in the theory and do not rush it into a ‘plot of contradictions’. My purpose in this paper is, first, to reconstruct Hegel´s exposition of the ‘Moral World View’ (I); then, to examine how much from this alleged contradiction can be attributed to Kant himself (II). As the result of this comparison between the Hegelian reconstruction of this theory and Kant´s own version of it is not favorable prima facie to Hegel, I will sketch, lastly, the possible reasons that justify Hegel´s critique of Kant, such as it is expounded in the Phenomenology of Spirit (III).