Exchanges of innovation resources inside venture capital portfolios

Abstract

I explore the prevalence of exchanges of innovation resources inside venture capital portfolios. I show that after companies join investors’ portfolios, several proxies of exchanges between them and portfolio companies (relative to matched nonportfolio companies) increase by an average of 60%. The increase holds when joining events are plausibly exogenous and when VCs’ bargaining power and potential conflicts of interest are low. Three novel mechanisms are supported: carve-outs, spawning, and recycling, whereby entrepreneurs divest innovation units, start new ventures, and reuse assets in other portfolio companies, respectively. Results suggest that returns to innovation are higher in venture capital portfolios.

Más información

Título de la Revista: Journal of Financial Economics
Volumen: 135
Número: 1
Editorial: Elsevier B.V.
Fecha de publicación: 2020
Página de inicio: 144
Página final: 168
DOI:

10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.05.017