Cost assignment model for electrical transmission system expansion: An approach through the Kernel theory

Evans, F; Zolezzi, JM; Rudnick H.

Abstract

A cost assignment model is proposed for the expansion of electrical transmission systems, based on the cooperation and interaction principles that are the foundation of the cooperative game theory. A solution algorithm is proposed that considers the development of independent cooperative games for each expansion segment and whose final assignment can be obtained by any game theory solution method (Kernel, Nucleolus, Shapley Value, etc.). The Kernel method was chosen because it has both equilibrium and transparency characteristics in the computation of final assignments. The model accepts both the technical (load nature, generation levels, etc.) and economic (power station marginal costs, etc.) variables that characterize the network to be analyzed. Cost assignment will depend both on the capacity economic use and the non-coincident maximum use of the expansion lines, made by individual and group agents.

Más información

Título según WOS: Cost assignment model for electrical transmission system expansion: An approach through the Kernel theory
Título según SCOPUS: Cost assignment model for electrical transmission system expansion: An approach through the kernel theory
Título de la Revista: IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS
Volumen: 18
Número: 2
Editorial: IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
Fecha de publicación: 2003
Página de inicio: 625
Página final: 632
Idioma: English
URL: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/lpdocs/epic03/wrapper.htm?arnumber=1198295
DOI:

10.1109/TPWRS.2003.810903

Notas: ISI, SCOPUS