Abstract

My aim is to lay out the main tenets of the philosophical dialogue engaged in by Alexandre Kojève and Trần Đức Thảo concerning the importance to be attributed to Hegel’s dialectic. After the publication of Kojève’s Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Trần Đức Thảo responded in an article published in Temps modernes, in which he recognizes the « profound originality » of this enterprise, but points out the insufficiencies it contains both from an exegetical and a systematic point of view. From a « materialist » standpoint, inspired by Marx, Trần Đức Thảo opposes the restriction of negativity to the anthropological level, which, as Kojève frequently admits, is attributable more to the commentator than the philosopher, since in Hegel’s « monist » system negativity truly extends universally. While for Kojève this « correction » to Hegel’s system makes it possible to preserve the irreducible character of human freedom – the genuine « seat » of negativity – this restriction involves a double danger for Trần Đức Thảo. Exegetically it endangers the overall coherence of Hegel’s system by introducing into it a breach and even an irrational moment. Furthermore, this restriction prevents the deployment of the « materialism » latent in Hegel and contributes willy-nilly to a « return to religious humanism ».