Abstract

The main goal of this thesis is to analyze if an ethical relativism could follow from Ludwig Wittgenstein´s Philosophical Investigations. My hypothesis is that an ethical relativism does not follow from the opening of the conditions of meaning that Wittgenstein presented in that book. To try to prove my hypothesis, I will list the conditions of sense that were defended in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, then I will try to locate ethics among those conditions. Afterwards, I will enumerate the main concepts of the Philosophical Investigations to search for the changes that happened regarding the Tractatus, and also to locate those points in which the Austrian philosopher did not change his perspective. Finally, I will list the different types of relativism that could be find among the different types of ethical discourse to question if the opening that the Philosophical Investigations proposed implies the possibility of the existence of ethical language games. Finally, I will argue that if the concept of form of life is read as a limit of the possibility of language, this means, as a transcendental limit knowledge, we can conclude that there is no ethical relativism.