Abstract

The adverse effects of Chile's neoliberal social housing policy have been evident for years. The housing deficit, amount of informal housing and pressure from citizen groups have increased in recent years. Numerous stop-gap strategies have been devised in order to contain its adverse effects, many of which can be classified as "exceptional" policy responses, as opposed to "standard" policy responses. Such strategies may include tailormade rights and arbitrary flexibility, the results of which are radically different from those of the "standard" policy. Our hypothesis is that exception is a government strategy to face the deficiencies and conflicts that the policy brings about. A qualitative study was carried out to study the origins, characteristic and repercussions of exception. The results showed four dimensions of this government strategy. First, the application of exception amid the occurrence of environmental emergencies. Second, the use of exception for economic and political purposes and interests. Third, when inhabitants demand exceptional measures. Fourth, when exceptional targeting mechanisms are created to deal with a population whose characteristics are so particular that they are beyond the sphere of political action. It is concluded that exceptions become the norm in a context of neoliberal governance of social housing policy.