Aristotle and Boethius: Two theses and their possibilities

Keywords: mental models, possibility, modal logic, Aristotle’s thesis, Boethius’ thesis

Abstract

There is a kind of logical theses that can be a cognitive problem. They are theses that are not tautologies and people tend to accept as absolutely correct. This is the case of theses such as those of Aristotle and Boethius. This paper tries to give an explanation of the reasons why this happens. The explanation is based on the theory of mental models. However, it also resorts to modal logic and the account of the ideas presented by Lenzen. Thus, relating the general framework of the theory of mental models to basic aspects of modal logic and this last account, a possible solution of the problem is proposed.

Más información

Título de la Revista: Praxis Filosófica
Número: 53
Editorial: Departamento de Filosofía, Universidad del Valle, Cali (Colombia)
Fecha de publicación: 2021
Página de inicio: 69
Página final: 84
Idioma: English
Financiamiento/Sponsor: PIA Ciencias Cognitivas, Centro de Investigación en Ciencias Cognitivas, Instituto de Estudios Humanísticos, Universidad de Talca. Fondo Fondecyt de Continuidad para Investigadores Senior, código FCSEN2102, Universidad de Talca.
URL: https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i53.11478
DOI:

https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i53.11478

Notas: SciELO, ERIH PLUS