On the generalized dimension and codimension of simple games

Molinero, Xavier; Riquelme, Fabian; Roura, Salvador; Serna, Maria

Abstract

Weighted voting games are simple games that can be represented by a collection of integer weights for each player so that a coalition wins if the sum of the player weights matches or exceeds a given quota. It is known that a simple game can be expressed as the intersection or the union of weighted voting games. The dimension (codimension) of a simple game is the minimum number of weighted voting games such that their intersection (union) is the given game. In this work, we analyze some subclasses of weighted voting games and their closure under intersection or union. We introduce generalized notions of dimen- sion and codimension regarding some subclasses of weighted voting games. In particular, we show that not all simple games can be expressed as intersection (union) of pure weighted voting games (those in which dummy players are not allowed) and we provide a characterization of such simple games. Finally, we experimentally study the generalized dimension (codimension) for some subclasses defined by estab- lishing restrictions on the representations of weighted voting games.(c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Más información

Título según WOS: On the generalized dimension and codimension of simple games
Título de la Revista: EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH
Volumen: 306
Número: 2
Editorial: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Fecha de publicación: 2023
Página de inicio: 927
Página final: 940
DOI:

10.1016/j.ejor.2022.07.045

Notas: ISI