Abstract

In this paper I examine the paradox of human subjectivity in light of the tension between two forms of approaching subjectivity (as transcendental subject or as empirical being) along with two other paradoxes that, I will argue, are also the expression of the larger tension between first-personal and third-personal accounts of experience. One is the “crazy paradox” Merleau-Ponty points to in his analyses of Husserl’s reflection on the notion of Earth as ground in the text “The originary ark, the Earth, does not move”. The other is the paradox of death, that consists of the contra- dictory understanding of my own death as being certain yet unconstitutable. I present a brief description of Husserl’s developments on death and argue that its peculiarities present a challenge for the phenomenological method as a whole, and for the distinc- tion between transcendental subjectivity and the empirical human being; then I offer a preliminary analysis of the Merleau-Pontian diagnosis of Husserl’s philosophy as well as Merleau-Ponty’s own way out of the paradox, and point out some of its insufficiencies.