Abstract

Husserl's analysis of reflection leads to the discovery of the anonymous character of functioning subjectivity, which is further developed through an examination of the living-present (Lebendige Gegenwart) in the context of his genetic account of time-constitution. Given phenomenology's reliance on first- personal access and evidence, the anonymity of the flow brings about certain questions regarding how to account for it and if it is indeed a part of my experience. In this paper, I reflect on the problem of accessing and accounting for the primal I in phenomenological reflection. Taking from Ronald Bruzina and László Tengelyi's readings, I claim that genetic analyses lead to an absolute Faktum in which the existence of Ego and World coincide. This brings me to consider whether the primacy of the primal-I (Ur-Ich) as the ultimate source of temporalization that is often displayed in Husserl's work can be considered a necessary result of the analysis of temporality or rather a theoretical gesture or choice in favor of maintaining the strong first-personal character of phenomenological inquiry. Against this view, a French-inspired interpretation that focuses on the equi-primordiality of primal-I and primal- Hyle can be seen as a rival reading that opens up a new path in the tradition.