Abstract

Chile is currently facing a mega-drought, which is expected to lead to a significant increase in the water stress level. Social conflicts related to water use are linked to the effects of climate change and a governance system marked by the privatization of the natural resources of public interest. This study aims to analyze whether the current Chilean water governance scheme can adapt to the effects of climate change through a critical observation of the role of the River Vigilance Committees (RVCs; private user organizations exercising the public function of water management), from the perspective of Ostrom's design principles for long-enduring Common-pool Resource (CPR) institutions. We analyze legal approaches, management mechanisms, and decision-making processes under the socio-climatic conditions that the country is currently facing. The results indicate that, with a few exceptions, the Chilean governance system does not allow RVCs to effectively incorporate the design principles-and, therefore, to achieve adaptation-due to dispersed functions, the exclusion of water users, and a lack of planning at different levels. We propose that water governance should consider the creation of River Basin Boards with broader planning powers, as well as the incorporation of different relevant stakeholders.