Abstract

Literature shows that business interest groups have fewer incentives to embrace outside lobbying in trade policy. This article proposes an alternative explanation. As we discuss, special economic interests are more likely to adopt a specific subtype of outside lobbying (press, media appearances and op-eds) when policymakers are not responsible for them, and their long-term interests associated with a model of open trade are potentially threatened. We test our argument with the case of Chile and the long debate around the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) ratification process. Our results support the hypothesis: businesses have a greater probability of media appearances, publishing op-eds, and the like, in comparison to other lobbies, such as labor and single-issue groups against the treaty. However, the effect is conditional to salience: the subtype of outside lobbying from business groups is more likely to be observed as the distance to the social outbursts of October 2019 increases.