Abstract

In this paper I will consider, firstly ,the delimitation Hegel makes between the conception of agency that ”abstract right” requires, summarized in the notion of ”person”, and the conception of agency that is properly ”moral”, summarized in the notion of ”subject”. Secondly, I will consider the terminological distinction made by Hegel between ”deed” (Tat) and ”action” (Handlung). Thirdly, I will deal with what Hegel calls ”the right of knowledge”, by means of which he tries to establish minimal conditions for the attribution of responsibility, and with what Hegel calls ”the right of intention”, which specifies better the kind of knowledge the agent must have in order to act intentionally. Finally, I will address ”the right of the subject to its particularity”, which aims to establish, in addition to the negative formal conditions for intentional action, its positive ones, which should include material specifications (well-being), that are rather vague in nature and potentially contrary to law.