Abstract

Epistemic injustice is defined as the harm inflicted on a person in their capacity as a knower and affects the generation and distribution of knowledge. It was described by Miranda Fricker, who distinguished two types: testimonial and hermeneutic. Testimonial injustice occurs when a person receives little credibility, and this is attributed to the presence of some negative stereotype, which harms and conditions their identity and affects their testimony. A hermeneutic injustice, on the other hand, occurs when a person's experience is not understood (by themselves or by others) because there is no concept available that can adequately identify or explain it. Both can affect healthcare contexts in different ways, involving everything from interpersonal relationships to institutional policies. When epistemic injustice appears, it is not considered an epistemic error but a moral error and, therefore, affects bioethics, demanding actions and re-commendations. This article will focus on the update of an emerging topic for bioethics, discussing its main scope in health care, academia, research, and medical education. A proposal for justice and epistemic solidarity will be offered based on the reflection that narrative methodologies allow us