Abstract

The majority constitutional dogmatic and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court have consistently affirmed that the inapplicability action implies a concrete control of the constitutionality of the laws. In the opinion of this dogmatic and jurisprudence, this control does not examine the constitutionality of the legal precept, but controls whether its application in a specific case produces unconstitutional effects. However, certain vices of constitutionality are original and affect the constitutionality of the legal norm. In which case, they would not be controllable in this way. However, subsequent control has been exercised with respect to them through the action of inapplicability. In this sense, the premise that guides this work is the following: the constitutional process in course opens a space to differentiate two types of exams in the field of inapplicability action. A control of the unconstitutional effects that a legal precept, not affected by a vice of unconstitutionality, generates by its application in a specific judicial management. And another, of a legal precept that will necessarily produce unconstitutional effects because it is unconstitutional. The first leads to concrete control and the second to abstract control. But above all, it is an opportunity to separate the current action of inapplicability into two actions, one of concrete control that resolves the cases in which a legal precept, applicable in a pending procedure, produces unconstitutional effects, and another action that implies an abstract control of the vices of unconstitutionality that affect a norm.