Optimal Bounds for Dissatisfaction in Perpetual Voting

Kozachinskiy A.; Shen, A; Steifer, T

Abstract

In perpetual voting, multiple decisions are made at different moments in time. Taking the history of previous decisions into account allows us to satisfy properties such as proportionality over periods of time. In this paper, we consider the following question: is there a perpetual approval voting method that guarantees that no voter is dissatisfied too many times? We identify a sufficient condition on voter behavior -which we call 'bounded conflicts' condition-under which a sublinear growth of dissatisfaction is possible. We provide a tight upper bound on the growth of dissatisfaction under bounded conflicts, using techniques from Kolmogorov complexity. We also observe that the approval voting with binary choices mimics the machine learning setting of prediction with expert advice. This allows us to present a voting method with sublinear guarantees on dissatisfaction under bounded conflicts, based on the standard techniques from prediction with expert advice.

Más información

Título según WOS: Optimal Bounds for Dissatisfaction in Perpetual Voting
Título de la Revista: THIRTY-NINTH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AAAI-25, VOL 39 NO 19
Editorial: ASSOC ADVANCEMENT ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Fecha de publicación: 2025
Página de inicio: 13977
Página final: 13984
Idioma: English
Notas: ISI